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Abstract
We show that the consistency problem for Statistical EL ontologies, defined by Peñaloza and Potyka in
SUM 2017, is ExpTime-hard. Together with recent developments of Baader and Ecke from GCAI 2017, we
conclude ExpTime-completeness of the logic. Our proof goes via a reduction from the consistency problem
for EL extended with negation of atomic concepts.
1 Introduction
Description logics (DLs) [BHLS17] are a prominent family of logical formalisms tailored to knowledge represen-
tation. Nowadays, real-world problems require the ability to handle uncertain knowledge. To deal with this issue,
several probabilistic extensions of description logics were proposed in the past [CLC17, Luk08, GBJLS17, PP17]
Among such extensions, the authors of [PP17] proposed Statistical EL, a statistical variant of the well-known
description logic EL [BBL05] famous for tractability of most of its reasoning task.
In this note we establish tight complexity bounds for the consistency problem for statistical EL, closing the
complexity gaps from [PP17]. We show that in sharp contrast to its non-probabilistic version, Statistical EL
is ExpTime-complete and hence, provably intractable. The main novelty here is the ExpTime lower bound,
while the ExpTime upper bound is derived from a recent work by Baader and Ecke [BE17].
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we recall the basics on description logics (DLs) EL and EL(¬). For readers unfamiliar with DLs
we recommend consulting the textbook [BHLS17], especially Chapters 2.1–2.3, 5.1 and 6.1.
We fix countably-infinite disjoint sets of concept names NC and role names NR. Starting from NC and NR,
the set CEL of EL concept descriptions (or simply EL concepts) [BBL05] is built using conjunction (C u D),
existential restriction (∃r .C) and the top concept (>), with the grammar below:
C,D ::= > | A | C uD | ∃r .C,
where C,D ∈ CEL, A ∈ NC and r ∈ NR. An EL general concept inclusion (GCI) has the form C v D for EL
concepts C,D ∈ CEL. An EL ontology is a finite non-empty set of EL GCIs. The size of an EL ontology is the
number of role names and concept names needed to write it, with every occurrence of a name contributing one.
Table 1: Concepts and roles in EL.
Name Syntax Semantics
top > ∆I
atomic concept A AI ⊆ ∆I
role r rI ⊆ ∆I×∆I
concept intersection C uD CI ∩DI
existential restriction ∃r .C {d | ∃e.(d, e) ∈ rI ∧ e ∈ CI}
The semantics of EL is defined via interpretations I = (∆I , ·I) composed of a finite non-empty set ∆I called
the domain of I and an interpretation function ·I mapping concept names to subsets of ∆I , and role names
to subsets of ∆I × ∆I . This mapping is extended to concepts, roles (cf. Table 1) and finally used to define
satisfaction of GCIs, namely I |= C v D iff CI ⊆ DI . We say that an interpretation I satisfies an ontology O
(or I is a model of O, written: I |= O) if it satisfies all GCIs from O. An ontology is consistent if it has a model
and inconsistent otherwise. In the consistency problem for EL we ask if an input EL ontology is consistent. Note
that the consistency problem for EL is trivial, i.e. every EL ontology is consistent.
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2.1 EL with atomic negation
The next definitions concern EL(¬), the extension of EL with negation of atomic concepts. More precisely, the
set CEL(¬) of EL(¬) concepts is defined with the slight extension of the BNF grammar for EL:
C,D ::= > | A | A¯ | C uD | ∃r .C,
where C,D ∈ CEL(¬) , A ∈ NC and r ∈ NR. The semantics of EL(¬) concepts is defined as in Table 1 with the
exception that the concepts of the form A¯ have the semantics A¯I = ∆I \AI . The notions of GCIs, ontologies
and the consistency problem are lifted to EL(¬) in an obvious way. We stress that in the presence of negation
the consistency problem for EL(¬) is no longer trivial and actually is ExpTime-complete [BBL05, Theorem 6].1
Proposition 2.1. There exists an EL ontology Ohard for which the consistency problem is ExpTime-hard.
For each concept name A let A? stands for one of A, A¯,>. An EL(¬) ontology is in normal form if every of
its GCIs is in one the forms: (i) A? v B? (ii) A? u B? v C? (iii) A? v ∃r .B? (iv) ∃r .B? v A?, for A,B,C ∈ NC.
By routine renaming technique it is easy to establish the following proposition (cf. [BHLS17, Chapter 6.1.1]):
Proposition 2.2. For every EL(¬) ontology O there is a polynomial-time computable equi-consistent EL(¬)
ontology O′ in normal form.
2.2 Statistical EL
Statistical EL, abbreviated as SEL, is a probabilistic DL introduced recently by Peñaloza and Potyka [PP17,
Section 4] to reason about statistical properties over finite domains. Statistical EL ontologies are composed
of probabilistic conditionals of the form (C | D) [k, l], where C,D are EL concepts from CEL and k, l ∈ Q are
rational numbers satisfying 0 ≤ k ≤ l ≤ 1. The size of SEL ontologies is defined as in EL except that the
numbers in probabilistic conditionals also contribute to the size and are measured in binary.
We say that an interpretation I satisfies a probabilistic conditional (C | D) [k, l] if:
either DI = ∅ or k ≤ |(C uD)
I |
|DI | ≤ l.
Note that a usual EL GCIs C v D are equivalent to (D | C) [1, 1] (cf. [PP17, Proposition 4]). Hence, each EL
ontology can be seen as an SEL ontology and we can freely use GCIs in place of probabilistic conditionals.
3 Main result
After introducing all the required definitions, we are ready to prove the main result of this note, namely:
Theorem 3.1. The consistency problem for SEL is ExpTime-complete.
The ExpTime upper bound follows from [BE17, Corollary 15], hence here we focus on the lower bound only.
LetOhard be an EL ontology having ExpTime-hard consistency problem (cf. Proposition 2.1). By Proposition 2.2
we assume that Ohard is in normal form. With COhard we denote the set of all concept names that appear (possibly
under negation) in Ohard. We next design an SEL ontology Ored such that Ored is consistent iff Ohard is and
that Ored is only polynomially larger than Ohard. It will be composed of two SEL ontologies, Otr and Ocorr,
responsible respectively for “translating” Ohard into SEL and for guaranteeing the correctness of the translation.
The main idea of the encoding is as follows. We first produce for each concept name A from COhard two fresh
concepts A+,A− intuitively intended to contain, respectively, all members of A and from its complement. Due
to the lack of negation, we clearly are not able to fully formalise the above intuition, but the best we can do is to
enforce, with the ontology Ocorr, that these concepts are interpreted as disjoint sets and each of them contains
exactly half of the domain. It is sufficient for our purposes, since with the fresh concepts Real+,Real− we can
separate the “real” model of Ohard from the auxiliary parts required for the encoding. Finally, in the “translation”
ontology Otr we state that the restriction of a model of Ored to Real+ satisfies Ohard. The translation simply
changes all occurrences of A (resp. A¯) into A+ (resp. A−) and employs Real+ to relativise concepts.
Let us start with the definition of Ocorr.2 We will always assume that Real 6∈ COhard .
Ocorr := {(A+ | >) [0.5, 0.5] , (A− | >) [0.5, 0.5] , (A+ | A−) [0, 0] | A ∈ {Real} ∪COhard}
By unfolding the definition of probabilistic conditionals we immediately conclude the following facts.
1 In the setting of [BBL05] the domains of interpretations might have unrestricted (i.e. not necessarily finite) sizes, but the result
is also applicable to our scenario since EL(¬) has finite model property, which follows from [BHLS17, Corr. 3.17].
2It should be made explicit (although it is reasonable to assume) that for every different concept names A 6= B from NC the
decorated names A+,B+,A−,B− are pairwise different.
2
Fact 3.2. For any concept name A we have that I |= (A | >) [0.5, 0.5] iff |∆I | is even and |AI | = 12 |∆I |.
Fact 3.3. For any different concept names A,B we have that I |= (A | B) [0, 0] iff AI ∩ BI = ∅.
Now we focus on the “translating” ontology Otr. Let tr be a function defined with tr(A) = A+ u Real+,
tr(A¯) = A−uReal+ and tr(>) = Real+ for all concept names A ∈ NC. The ontology Otr is obtained by replacing
each occurrence of (possibly negated) concept name A in Otr with tr(A). Finally, we set Ored := Ocorr ∪ Otr.
Note that the size of Ored is polynomial in |Ohard|. To get more intuitions, consult the picture below.
reduction
d2: A, B¯
d3: A,B
d1: A¯,B d′1: A+,B−
d′2: A−,B+
d′3: A−,B−
d3: A+,B+
d2: A+,B−
d1: A−,B+
Real+
Real−
J |= Ored
I |= Ohard
Lemma 3.4
Lemma 3.5
3.1 Correctness of the reduction
Now we are ready to prove the correctness of the reduction. We first show that the consistency of Ohard implies
the consistency of Ored. In the proof we basically take a model of Ohard, duplicate each domain element and
define the memberships of fresh concepts introduced by Ored. Such concepts are defined in a way that if an
element from a model I of Ohard is a member of AI then the corresponding element in a constructed model J
for Ored is a member of AJ+ while its copy belongs to AJ− . In this way, the total number of elements in every
concept is always equal to half of the domain.
Lemma 3.4. If Ohard is consistent then so is Ored.
Proof. Let I |= Ohard and let ∆I = {d1,d2, . . . ,dn}. Since Real 6∈ Ohard we can assume that RealI = ∅.
We define an interpretation J , intended to be a model of Ored, as follows:
1. ∆J := {d1,d′1,d2,d′2, . . . ,dn,d′n}
2. For all concept names A ∈ COhard we set:
• AJ+ := {di | di ∈ AI} ∪ {d′i | di 6∈ AI} and AJ− := {di | di 6∈ AI} ∪ {d′i | di ∈ AI},
• RealJ+ := ∆I and RealJ− := ∆J \∆I
and for other concept names B we set BI := ∆I .
3. For each role name r we set rJ := rI .
We first show J |= Ocorr. To do it, take any name A ∈ {Real} ∪COhard . We prove J |= (A+ | A−) [0, 0], which
by Fact 3.3 is equivalent to showing disjointness of AJ+ and AJ− . Assume the contrary, i.e. that there is a domain
element d ∈ AJ+ ∩ AJ− . If d = di for some index i then, by Item 2, it means that di ∈ AI and di 6∈ AI at the
same time, which is clearly not possible. The case when d = d′i for some index i is treated similarly: d′i ∈ AJ−
implies di ∈ AI and d′i ∈ AJ+ implies di 6∈ AI leading to a contraction.
Next, by invoking Item 2 of the definition of J we can perform some basic calculations:
|AJ+ | = |{di | di ∈ AI}|+ |{d′i | di 6∈ AI}| = |{di | di ∈ AI}|+ |{di | di 6∈ AI}| = |∆I | = 0.5 · |∆J |.
|AJ− | = |{di | di 6∈ AI}|+|{d′i | di ∈ AI}| = |{d′i | di 6∈ AI}|+|{d′i | di ∈ AI}| = |{d′1, . . . ,d′n}| = 0.5·|∆J |.
Hence by Fact 3.2 we get J |= (A+ | >) [0.5, 0.5]. and J |= (A− | >) [0.5, 0.5], finishing the proof of J |= Ocorr.
To prove J |= Otr we perform a routine case analysis. The general proof outline is as follows. We take any
probabilistic conditional ε = C v D from Otr corresponding to a translation of some ε′ = C′ v D′ from Ohard.
Next, we take any d ∈ CJ and show that then d ∈ (C′)I . Since I |= ε′ it implies d ∈ (D′)I , hence also d ∈ DJ .
We first show that an element d belongs to a concept in I iff d belongs to its translation in J . Then we
apply this reasoning to concepts C,C′ and concepts D′,D accordingly.
Due to the assumption that Ohard is in normal form, the only relevant cases are:
• d ∈ >I iff d ∈ RealJ+ : follows from the equality >I = ∆I = RealJ+ (Item 2).
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• d ∈ AI iff d ∈ (A+ u Real+)J . If d ∈ AI then by Item 1 we infer d ∈ ∆I = RealJ+ , while by Item 2 we
obtain d ∈ AJ+ , implying d ∈ (A+uReal+)J . For the opposite direction, we know that if d ∈ (A+uReal+)J
then d ∈ RealJ+ = ∆I and by d ∈ AJ+ we conclude d ∈ AI .
• d ∈ A¯I iff d ∈ (A−uReal+)J . We proceed similarly to the previous case. If d ∈ A¯I then d ∈ ∆I and hence
d ∈ RealJ+ . Since d 6∈ AI , by Item 2 we infer d ∈ AJ− , which implies d ∈ (A− u Real+)J . For the opposite
direction, we know that if d ∈ (A− u Real+)J then d ∈ RealJ+ = ∆I and by d ∈ AJ− we get d ∈ A¯
I .
• d ∈ (A? u B?)I iff d ∈ (tr(A?) u tr(B?))J : follows from three previous cases.
• d ∈ (∃r .A?)I iff d ∈ (∃r .tr(A?))J . From left to right: if d ∈ (∃r .A?)I then d ∈ ∆I = RealJ+ ⊆ ∆J and
there is e ∈ (A?)I such that (d, e) ∈ rI . By the first three cases we infer e ∈ tr(A?)J . By Item 3 we know
that rI = rJ , so (d, e) ∈ rJ . Hence d ∈ (∃r .tr(A?))J . From right to left: if d ∈ (∃r .tr(A?))J then there
exists an element e witnessing e ∈ tr(A?)J and (d, e) ∈ rJ . From rI = rJ we infer that (d, e) ∈ ∆I ×∆I .
Moreover, by the first three cases, e ∈ tr(A?)J implies e ∈ (A?)I . Thus, d ∈ (∃r .A?)I .
By applying the reasoning described before the case analysis we conclude J |= Otr. Hence, J |= Ored.
The next lemma claims that the consistency of Ored implies the consistency of Ohard. We basically show that
the model of Ohard can be retrieved from a submodel of Ored restricted to the members of Real+.
Lemma 3.5. If Ored is consistent then so is Ohard.
Proof. Let J |= Ored. We define an interpretation I, intended to be a model of Ohard, as follows:
1. ∆I := RealJ+ .
2. For each concept name A ∈ COhard we set AI := AJ+ ∩ RealJ+ .
3. For other concept names B we set BI := ∆I .
4. For every role name r ∈ NR we set rI := rJ ∩ (∆I ×∆I).
Now it remains to show that I |= Ohard. The proof is analogous to the one from Lemma 3.4. Take any GCI
C v D ∈ Ohard corresponding to some translated GCI C′ v D′ ∈ Otr. We take any d ∈ CI and show that
then d ∈ (C′)J . Since J |= C′ v D′ we conclude d ∈ (D′)J . Finally, we prove that d ∈ (D′)J implies d ∈ DJ
allowing us to finish the proof. The missing pieces in the outline of the proof are shown by proving the following
equivalence: an element d belongs to a concept in I iff d belongs to its translation in J . Then we apply this
reasoning to concepts C,C′ and concepts D′,D accordingly. Since Ohard is in normal form, the relevant cases are:
• d ∈ >I iff d ∈ RealJ+ : follows from the equality ∆I = RealJ+ (Item 1).
• d ∈ AI iff d ∈ (A+ u Real+)J : follows from the equality AJ+ ∩ RealJ+ = AI (Item 2).
• d ∈ A¯I iff d ∈ (A− u Real+)J .
For right to left direction take d ∈ AJ− ∩RealJ+ . Then d ∈ RealJ+ = ∆I and d ∈ AJ− . Ad absurdum, assume
that d 6∈ A¯I , which is equivalent to d ∈ AI . But then by Item 2 we get d ∈ AJ+ . Hence d ∈ AJ+ ∩ AJ− .
However, due to J |= Ocorr and Fact 3.3 the concepts A+,A− are interpreted as disjoint sets. Contradiction.
For the other side take d ∈ A¯I . It means that d ∈ ∆I = RealJ+ and that d 6∈ AI . Then, note that d 6∈ AJ+ .
Indeed, if d ∈ AJ+ then d ∈ AI = AJ+ ∩RealJ+ . To see that d ∈ AJ− observe that by Fact 3.3 and J |= Ocorr
the sets AJ+ ,AJ− are disjoint subsets of ∆J . Moreover, by Fact 3.2 their sizes sum up to the size of the whole
domain ∆J . Hence, by the finiteness of ∆J we get AJ− = ∆J \AJ+ . Since d ∈ ∆J , we conclude d ∈ AJ− .
• d ∈ (A? u B?)I iff d ∈ (tr(A?) u tr(B?))J : follows from the previous cases.
• d ∈ (∃r .A?)I iff d ∈ (∃r .tr(A?))J .
Take d ∈ (∃r .A?)I . Then there exists an element e ∈ (A?)I such that (d, e) ∈ rI . From the previous cases
we deduce that e ∈ tr(A?)J . Moreover, from Item 4 we know that rI = rJ . Hence d ∈ (∃r .tr(A?))J . For
the opposite direction, take d ∈ (∃r .tr(A?))J . Then there exists an element e ∈ rJ satisfying (d, e) ∈ rJ
and e ∈ tr(A?)J . From the previous cases we get e ∈ (A?)I . With rI = rJ we conclude d ∈ (∃r .A?)I .
This concludes the case analysis, thus also the proof of I |= Ohard.
Lemma 3.4 and Lemma 3.5 show that the presented reduction is correct, hence we conclude the main theorem.
Theorem 3.6. The consistency problem for Statistical EL is ExpTime-hard and remains ExpTime-hard even
if the only numbers used in probabilistic conditionals are 0, 0.5 and 1.
With the already mentioned upper bound [BE17, Corollary 15] by Baader and Ecke, we conclude Theorem 3.1.
4
4 Conclusions
We proved that the consistency problem for Statistical EL ontologies is ExpTime-complete. While the upper
bound was derived from the recent work by Baader and Ecke [BE17] on (the extensions of) ALC with cardinality
constraints, the main novelty of the paper is the established lower bound. Our proof went via a reduction from
the consistency problem for EL(¬) ontologies and heavily relied on the fact that probabilistic conditionals can
express that exactly half of the domain elements belong to a certain concept.
For the future work, it would be interesting to consider extensions of other well-known decidable frag-
ments of first-order logic extended with probabilistic conditionals. Promising candidates are the guarded frag-
ment [ANvB98], the guarded negation fragment [BtCS15], the two-variable logic [GKV97] and tamed fragments
of existential rules [MT14]. Another idea is to study query answering [OS12] in the presence of probabilistic
conditionals. Some initial results were obtained in [BBR20].
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